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Abstract
The Kurdistan Region of  Iraq has made 
greater strides towards gender equal-
ity than the federal government of  Iraq, 
with CEDAW principles and the Women, 
Peace and Security agenda internalised 
to a greater extent in regional laws and 
regulations. Women’s rights activism and 
some policymakers’ willingness to realise 
change have played important roles in 
this. However, discriminatory rules and 
practices still exist, and changes are not 
fully implemented and monitored in the 
Region. This paper argues that the Kurd-
istan Region’s policies of  gender equality 
are linked to its dependence on multilat-
eral organisations and Western states, as 
well as its government’s aspiration to gain 
international legitimacy for statehood. 
Long-term international involvement in 
the Kurdistan Region has strengthened 
Kurdish autonomy, integrated interna-
tional actors into administrative, political, 
economic and social life, and created the 
perception that external connections are 
helping the Region achieve its ultimate 
goal of  independence.
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2015 as part of  a collaboration project between LSE 
and the American University in Dubai and was funded 
by the LSE Collaboration with Arab Universities Pro-
gramme supported by the Emirates Foundation. I would 
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from UN Women in Iraq, UNAMI, the Kurdish gov-
ernment, Kurdish political parties and local civil society 
organisations in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah, and individ-
ual lawyers, activists and academics for their generosity 
in sharing their expertise and views. I would also like to 
thank Nadje Al-Ali, Aula Hariri and Chelsea Milsom 
for their comments on earlier versions of  this paper.
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Introduction
Iraq’s unique political landscape has allowed international principles to be adopted to 
different extents within the single state. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has 
introduced more laws and regulations addressing gender equality than the federal govern-
ment. This paper examines the reasons behind this and argues that intersecting factors 
at local and international levels have played significant roles. International involvement 
influenced the Kurdistan Region and the rest of  Iraq differently and led to different types 
of  international links. Crucially, it increased Kurdish self-rule in Iraq. This differential 
impact has shaped the incorporation of  principles of  gender equality in different ways 
within Iraq. 
One way of  assessing gender equality is to examine the extent to which gender norms of 
the Convention on the Elimination of  Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the 
United Nations (UN) Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda are embedded in legal 
texts and policies. CEDAW, an international treaty adopted in 1979 by the UN General 
Assembly, defines what constitutes discrimination against women and suggests ways to end 
it. The WPS agenda, which encompasses the UN Security Council Resolution 1325 (Res-
olution 1325) and the seven resolutions that followed it, addresses the impact of  armed 
conflict on women and emphasises women’s role in conflict prevention and resolution.1 
The incorporation of  CEDAW and WPS principles into a constitution and other legal 
documents is not a full indicator of  gender equality, but it is a sign of  some degree of  com-
mitment at policy level.
Iraq, including the Kurdistan Region,2 became a signatory to CEDAW in 1986 but 
with reservations, particularly in relation to its family law that regulates marriage, 
divorce and inheritance. What is curious, however, is the discrepancy between the 
KRG and the Iraqi government in their adoption of  CEDAW and WPS principles. 
In 2014, the KRG and the Iraqi government together launched the Iraqi National 
Action Plan (I-NAP) to implement the WPS agenda for the period 2014–2018.3 Still, 
laws and regulations at the regional level in the Kurdistan Region are more compati-
ble with these principles than at the national level. This doesn’t mean that all laws and 
1  Resolution 1325 (2000) is the main UN resolution that brings together gender-related norms under 
the context of  peace and security, see: Sanam N. Anderlini, What the Women Say: Participation and UNSCR 
1325 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Centre for International Studies, 2010).
2  The Kurdistan Region, composed of  the governorates of  Erbil, Duhok and Sulaymaniyah, is often 
referred to as a ‘de facto state’, see: Yaniv Voller, ‘Countering Violence against Women in Iraqi Kurdis-
tan: State-building and Transnational Advocacy’, International Journal of  Middle East Studies 46/2 (2014), 
pp. 351–372; or as a ‘quasi state’, see: Denise Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State: Development and Dependency in 
Post-Gulf  War in Iraq (New York: Syracuse University Press, 2010). 
3  Available at: http://www.peacewomen.org/sites/default/files/iraq_nap.pdf. Iraq is the first state 
in the Middle East with such a plan. However, the Plan remains limited in sufficiently addressing 
issues related to the WPS agenda. Zeynep N. Kaya, ‘Women, Peace and Security in Iraq’, Middle East 
Centre Report (London: London School of  Economics, August 2016). Available at: http://eprints.lse.
ac.uk/67347/1/WPSIraq.pdf.
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institutional rules in the Kurdistan Region are gender equal in the way defined by inter-
national women’s rights documents and new laws are not always properly implemented. 
While the KRG has developed a more explicit strategy for improving women’s status 
through legal reform, it is hard to ascertain whether this strategy is genuine or instru-
mental. It is worth exploring the underlying factors in order to understand why the KRG 
appears to be more committed to pursuing a women’s rights agenda, at least at policy level. 
This paper argues that this is not simply because the Kurdistan Region is more progressive 
than Iraq as a whole when it comes to women’s rights, as advanced by the official rhetoric. 
The nationalist quest for statehood and desire for increased international legitimacy also 
provide suitable motivation for the KRG to adopt a more explicit policy of  gender equal-
ity. The Kurdistan Region’s international links to multilateral organisations and Western 
states have provided a facilitating context for such a motivation to be pursued.
Gender Equality in the Kurdistan Region
There is a long history of  women’s rights activism in both Iraq as a whole and in the 
Kurdistan Region, as well as long-standing momentum from below to enact change, and 
a willingness to realise this change among certain sections of  policymakers. A number 
of  women’s organisations actively addressed women’s unfair treatment under Hashemite 
rule. Several were also active under the Baʿath regime, during which Iraqi women’s status 
improved as they were admitted to universities, government offices and the labour force. 
The 1970 Provisional Constitution declared men and women equal under the law.4 These 
advances took place, according to some experts, in order to recruit women into authori-
tarian structures, and women’s organisations remained under strict regime control.5 
Later in the 1990s, the Baʿath regime’s increased reliance on conservative tribal and religious 
groups, combined with the impact of  war and international sanctions, led to the beating 
back of  advances made in previous decades.6 The 2003 intervention, followed by sectarian 
violence, political instability and economic deprivation, further disadvantaged women in 
both private and public domains.7 Article 41 of  the new Iraqi Constitution provided a legal 
context for discrimination against women under the pretext of  religious affiliation.
4  Lucy Brown and David Romano, ‘Women in Post-Saddam Iraq: One Step Forward or Two Steps 
Back?’, NWSA Journal 18/3 (2006), pp. 51–70. 
5  Ibid.
6  ‘Iraqi Women in Armed Conflict and Post-Conflict Situation’, Shadow Report submitted to the CEDAW 
Committee at the 57th Session, February 2014. Available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/
Shared%20Documents/IRQ/INT_CEDAW_NGO_IRQ_16192_E.pdf.
7  Nadje Al-Ali and Nicola Pratt, What Kind of  Liberation? Women and Occupation of  Iraq (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of  California Press, 2009).
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Women in the Kurdistan Region faced similar issues to women in other parts of  Iraq. 
Many Kurdish women’s rights activists worked in collaboration with those based in Bagh-
dad. However, the situation of  Kurdish women was worse off  compared to those in other 
parts of  Iraq before 2003, especially before the 1991 international intervention. This was 
due to conflicts between Kurdish forces and the Baghdad regime, limited government pro-
vision for infrastructure, education and health services, and general economic deprivation 
in the Region.8 Kurdish women’s rights activists and government officers often mention 
the suffering of  the Kurdish Region at the hands of  the Baʿath regime in the past, which 
left the Region in relative deprivation economically and socially. After 2003, the situation 
of  Kurdish women changed. Relative security and higher levels of  gender mainstream-
ing in legal documents meant that Kurdish women appeared to be in a better position. 
Unfortunately, however, so-called ‘honour’ killings, self-immolation and female genital 
mutilation cases continued, especially in rural Kurdish areas. Kurdish women still face 
widespread violence and are seen to hold an inferior position in society. 
Today, local women’s organisations use the principles of  international treaties and res-
olutions endorsed by Iraq to apply pressure on the government to update laws and 
regulations and to ensure their implementation. This is accompanied by pressure from 
international actors for institutional and legal reform. For instance, Resolution 1325 has 
been an important instrument for framing demands to maintain the gender quota and to 
push for greater involvement by women in decision-making and national reconciliation.9 
According to the I-NAP and the Shadow Report,10 submitted by local non-governmen-
tal organisations (NGOs) for the CEDAW Committee in 2014, the KRG has a more 
advanced track record of  gender-equal laws and rules. Testament to this are the higher 
gender quotas at the parliamentary, legislative, provincial and governorate levels (30 per-
cent as opposed to 25 percent at the national level) since 2009,11 which led to larger 
female representation in the Kurdish parliament (Figure 1), as well as a higher number of 
amended and new law articles in line with international norms on women’s rights. 
The KRG established a number of  new institutional bodies to specifically address wom-
en’s issues and support gender mainstreaming in policy-making in the Region. It created 
a special directory to follow-up on cases of  violence against women and instituted special 
domestic violence courts in all three Kurdish governorates. The High Council of  Women’s 
Affairs was established with the aim of  enhancing the status of  women through advising 
the government on gender mainstreaming policies and developing appropriate strategies.12 
8  Brown and Romano, ‘Women in Post-Saddam Iraq’.
9  Nicola Pratt, ‘Iraqi Women and UNSCR 1325: An Interview with Sunduz Abbas, Director of  the 
Iraqi Women’s Leadership Institute, Baghdad, January 2011’, International Journal of  Feminist Politics 13/4 
(2011), p 615.
10  CEDAW Shadow Report.
11  Gender quota was the outcome of  the Iraqi women’s organisations’ work in Baghdad. 
12  ‘Statebuilding and Gender in the Kurdistan Region of  Iraq’, LSE Middle East Centre Workshop Report 
(London: London School of  Economics, 2014), p. 4. Available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/middleEast-
Centre/publications/other/StatebuildingGenderKRI.pdf.
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Figure 1. Percentage of Seats Occupied by Women
Source: Department of Human Development Statistics, Iraq Human Development Report (Central Statistical Organization, 2014). 
The Kurdish government has also introduced amendments to the Iraqi Personal Status 
Law and the Penal Code at the regional level, reinforcing provisions on gender main-
streaming. For example, restrictions have been introduced to the law on polygamy, limiting 
a husband’s ability to have multiple wives. The Law Against Domestic Violence, adopted 
in 2011, holds perpetrators accountable for their actions, including acts perpetrated by 
husbands against their wives, and offers more protection for the victims. It removes mit-
igating circumstances that alleviate the punishment of  perpetrators of  so-called honour 
killing and bans female genital mutilation. Moreover, in order to tackle violence against 
women in a more systematic way, the KRG developed and ratified a national strategy.13 
However, these measures did not lead to meaningful changes on the ground. There is a 
significant time gap between the adoption of  new policies and laws and their implemen-
tation. The reference to Shariʿa Law in the Iraqi Constitution is not specifically defined, 
which leads to different interpretations of  Islamic rules, making legislation difficult. Male 
judges, who do not always implement the new laws that provide gender equality and 
fairness, govern most courts.14 Although the Kurdish law treats honour killing in the same 
way as any other murder, the practice continues and women’s organisations believe it 
is increasing. Kurdish government’s statistics for 2013 reveal that 236 women suffered 
injuries from having been burned and another 113 from self-immolation. The forensic 
institute in the Kurdistan Region reported the death of  1,748 women by burning, shoot-
ing or suffocation in 2013.15 
13  Kurdistan Regional Government Supreme Council for Women Affairs, National Strategy to Combat 
Violence against Women in Kurdistan, 2012–2016. Available at: http://www.ekrg.org/files/pdf/strategy_
combat%20violence_against_women_English.pdf.
14  Author interview with the General Director of  Legal and Human Rights Protection, Ministry of 
Human Rights, KRG, Erbil (April–May 2014). 
15  Kvinna till Kvinna Foundation, Fact Sheet: Violence against Women in Iraq (Johannesnov, Sweden, 2014). 
Available at: http://kvinnatillkvinna.se/en/files/qbank/217b4c71837fac172fabebfc299f755b.pdf.
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Kurdish women’s participation in political and public life still remains limited. Even 
though there are more women in the Kurdish parliament and in local councils, the 
number of  women occupying executive positions is still very small. In the current 2014 
Kurdish government, among twenty-one ministers, only one is a woman (Municipalities 
and Tourism). Most female representatives rely on nomination by male party leaders and 
reflect the party’s attitude towards women’s issues, being unwilling or unable to initiate 
change.16 In 2014, of  250 judges, only 12 were female (two in Duhok, four in Erbil and 
six in Sulaymaniyah).17 
A RAND report shows that the Kurdistan Region had a smaller labour force (for both 
women and men) in 2012 compared to some countries in the region, such as Turkey 
and Egypt (Figure 2). The report links this outcome to the low participation of  Kurdish 
women in the labour market (Figure 3).
Figure 2. Percentage of Population in Labour Force in the Kurdistan Region (aged 
15 and older)
Source: RAND, Capacity Building at the Kurdistan Region Statistics Office (2012). 
Figure 3: Percentage of Employed and Unemployed Labour Force in Iraqi Kurdistan*
Source: RAND, Capacity Building at the Kurdistan Region Statistics Office (2012).
* Participation in the labour force is lower among those aged 15–24 due to school attendance.
16  Author interviews with Kurdish academics, Erbil (April 2014).
17  Email correspondence with a Kurdish female judge (June 2015). 
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In 2012, the illiteracy rate18 among women (aged 15 and above) was significantly higher 
in the Kurdistan Region, 36–40 percent, compared to Iraq as a whole (24 percent).19 Data 
from 2013 reveals a slightly improved picture: 29–33 percent in Duhok, 25–29 percent in 
Erbil and 21–24 percent in Sulaymaniyah of  women (aged 12 and above) were illiterate; 
whereas the average illiteracy rate in Iraq as a whole increased to 28 percent.20 However, 
the difference between the 2012 and 2013 data can be attributed to a change in the way 
that data is counted and a change in how age groups are measured. A combination of  rea-
sons could explain the relatively lower levels of  literacy among women in the Kurdistan 
Region: the relative deprivation of  northern Iraq and limited provision of  public services 
for Kurds under the Baʿath regime in the past, the long conflict between the regime and 
Kurdish military forces until the 1990s, internal conflict between Kurdish factions in the 
mid-1990s and the international sanctions that followed the Gulf  War in 1991. Although 
the Kurdistan Region received international aid in the 1990s, this support came mainly 
in the form of  relief  and infrastructure, rather than social, educational and economic 
development and therefore did not lead to better education in the long-term. Indeed, data 
from 2010 shows that the illiteracy rate was higher not only among women but across the 
Kurdish Region as a whole.21
These numbers highlight the fact that higher levels of  participation and amended laws 
do not necessarily translate into substantive representation22 or improvement in women’s 
educational, economic and social status. According to Kurdish NGOs and activists, this 
is due to a lack of  awareness about women’s rights, women’s economic dependence, the 
heavier burden of  childcare and family responsibilities on women, and the influence of 
conservative views of  religious and tribal authorities on the role of  women in society. They 
believe that these issues remain due to a lack of  incentives at the governmental level to 
push the gender mainstreaming agenda forward.23 Kurdish government officials, on the 
other hand, state that the need to prioritise security, stability and economic development, 
as well as the limited economic and institutional capacity for implementation and moni-
toring, have impeded such efforts.24
18  UN’s definition of  literacy is the ability to read and write a simple statement related to daily life as 
well as basic numeric skills.
19  ‘Women in Iraq Fact Sheet’, Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit (March 2012). Available at: http://
reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Women%20In%20Iraq%20Fact%20sheet%20-%20
English.pdf.
20  ‘Women in Iraq Fact Sheet’, Inter-Agency Information and Analysis Unit (March 2013). Available at: 
http://www.iau-iraq.org/documents/1864/Woman-Factsheet.pdf.
21  ‘Literacy in Iraq Fact Sheet’, UNESCO (September 2010). Available at: http://www.unesco.org/
fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/FIELD/Iraq/pdf/Literacy_Day_Factsheet_Sep8_EN.pdf.
22  Mona Lena Krook, Diana Z. O’Brien and Krista M. Swip, ‘Military Invasion and Women’s Political 
Participation’, International Feminist Journal of  Politics 21/1 (2010), p. 75.  
23  Author interviews with local women’s rights NGOs, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah (April–May 2014). 
24  Author interviews with members of  the Department of  Foreign Relations, KRG, Erbil (April 2014). 
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Officials and local NGOs would nonetheless both argue that Kurdish women are in a 
better position than women in other parts of  Iraq today. Several datasets collated by inter-
national and national agencies in recent years seem to show this. The Gender Inequality 
Index (GII), based on reproductive health, empowerment and labour market participa-
tion, in the Kurdistan Region is lower than that of  the rest of  Iraq (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Gender Inequality Index25 in Iraq and the Kurdistan Region 
Source: UNDP, Iraq Human Development Report (2014).
According to the Iraqi government’s I-WISH survey results in 2012, a large proportion of 
women in the Kurdistan Region face impediments in public participation, achieve lower 
levels of  educational attainment than men, and experience discrimination and violence.26 
But the survey also shows Kurdish women’s perception of  their status and circumstances 
is slightly better than that of  women in the rest of  Iraq. More women in the Region feel 
they can participate in politics (Figure 5) and that the gender balance is not favourable 
towards men. 
However, UNDP GII and I-WISH data should be understood in the correct context. The 
instability and violence experienced among communities outside the Kurdistan Region is a 
significant factor that might have influenced women’s perceptions of  their experiences and 
rights. This is especially important considering that Iraqi women’s social and economic 
wellbeing was better before the 1991 Gulf  War and particularly deteriorated after the 
2003 intervention relative to their Kurdish counterparts.
25  The Gender Inequality Index (GII) measures development performance based on gender inequality 
and looks at three dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment and labour market participation. 
The GII ranges between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating absolute equality between men and women, and 1 
indicating 100% inequality.
26  ‘Iraqi Women Integrated Social and Health Survey (I-WISH)’, Central Statistical Organisation, Ministry 
of  Planning in Iraq, 2012. I-WISH covered 10,620 households and was conducted in all governorates, 
districts and villages in Iraq.
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Figure 5: Women’s (aged 15–54) View on Participation in Politics (Percentage)27 
Source: I-WISH (2012).
The Shadow Report on the implementation of  CEDAW in Iraq,28 prepared and submitted 
by Iraqi NGOs in 2014, draws attention to the widening gap in gender equality in Iraqi 
society and the persistence of  discriminatory laws and practices within the legal system. 
The report states that the growth of  militancy and extremism, along with deteriorating 
economic and social conditions since the 2003 intervention, led to a further increase in 
violence against women and the restriction of  women’s freedom of  movement in public.29 
This was despite the gains made through the political participation of  women and local 
campaigns to prevent violence against women. The I-NAP draws similar conclusions, 
emphasising the impact of  war and conflict. It is hard to confirm whether the I-WISH 
survey reflects a temporary situation due to ongoing conflict or not, and whether it is an 
actual reflection of  reality on the ground despite a lack of  large scale continuous surveys.
Explaining the KRG’s Different Gender Equality Strategy 
If  we were to assume that the Kurdistan Region has distinct historical, cultural, insti-
tutional and political characteristics, it would be easy to explain the difference between 
the KRG’s and the Iraqi Government’s gender policies. However, the Kurdistan 
Region cannot be simply seen as distinct from Iraq as a whole. It has common insti-
tutional, economic and social characteristics with the wider country, and shares similar 
cultural and social values about women’s roles in society. Kurdish and Arab women’s 
activism focus on similar issues, such as violence against women and women’s empow-
erment. They both have played important roles throughout history in pushing the 
27  Figures 5 was developed for this paper based on I-WISH data. 
28  ‘Iraqi Women in Armed Conflict and Post Conflict Situation’, Shadow Report submitted to the CEDAW 
Committee at the 57th Session, 2014. Available at: http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CEDAW/
Shared%20Documents/IRQ/INT_CEDAW_NGO_IRQ_16192_E.pdf.
29  CEDAW Shadow Report, pp. 7–9. 
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agenda for gender mainstrea§ming and increasing awareness of  women’s rights.30 
Resolution 1325 has been positively received by both groups of  women and seen as an 
important instrument for framing demands in maintaining the quota and in pushing for 
women’s involvement in decision-making, conflict resolution and reconciliation.31 Kurdish 
and Arab women’s groups formed overarching committees such as the Women for Lasting 
Peace Initiative, UNSCR 1325 Group and the I-NAP Initiative, and were both involved 
in drafting the I-NAP.32 
It is also important to note that Iraqi society, like any other society, is heterogenous in terms 
of  gender norms. The differential influence of  religious, sectarian, ethnic, geographical 
and class-related factors affecting women across Iraq is well established.33 Differences 
within Iraq are not necessarily drawn along Kurdish–Arab lines, and heterogeneity exists 
not only in the whole of  Iraq but also within the Kurdistan Region. There are signifi-
cant differences between rural–urban, educated–non-educated and working–stay-at-home 
women, and between family and political ties both in the Kurdish Region and in Iraq as 
a whole. 
Therefore, it is necessary to explore factors other than the domestic social context and to 
consider the complex intersection between the local and international. Indeed, transnational 
feminist literature indicates that processes shaping the way international gender norms are 
incorporated into domestic contexts are neither purely domestic nor international.34 
One such factor is Kurdish aspiration for statehood and the KRG’s need for international 
support in order to achieve it. Many Kurds believe that remaining part of  Iraq hinders 
their economic, social and democratic progress.35 According to a 2015 poll, 82 percent of 
respondents in the Kurdistan Region supported decentralisation and believed that their 
Region should become independent. The majority of  these respondents are supporters of 
the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), a party with relatively bad relations with the gov-
ernment in Baghdad compared to the Patriotic Union of  Kurdistan (PUK).36 Indeed, the 
domestic political context is complex, shaped by long-term rivalry and divisions between 
30  Nadje Al-Ali and Nicola Pratt, ‘Between Nationalism and Women’s Rights: The Kurdish Women’s 
Movement in Iraq’, Middle East Journal of  Culture and Communication 4 (2011), pp. 339–355; Noga Efrati, 
‘Negotiating Rights in Iraq: Women and the Personal Status Law’, The Middle East Journal 59/4 (2005), 
pp. 577–595; Andrea Fischer-Tahir, ‘Competition, Cooperation and Resistance: Women in the Polit-
ical Field in Iraq’, International Affairs 86/6 (2010), pp. 1381–1394; Jacqueline S. Ismael and Shereen 
T. Ismael, ‘Living through War, Sanctions and Occupation: The Voices of  Iraqi Women’, International 
Journal of  Contemporary Iraqi Studies 2/3 (2008), pp. 409–424.
31  Pratt, ‘Iraqi Women and UNSCR 1325’, p. 612.
32  Author interview with UN Women representative (March 2015).
33  Nadje Al-Ali, ‘Reconstructing Gender: Iraqi Women between Dictatorship, War, Sanctions and 
Occupation’, Third World Quarterly 36/4 (2005), pp. 739–758. 
34  Susan Zwingel, ‘How Do Norms Travel? Theorizing International Women’s Rights in Transnational 
Perspective’, International Studies Quarterly 56/1 (2012), pp. 115–129.
35  Such sentiments are expressed in the media as well. See for example: ‘Is 2016 the Kurdish goodbye to 
Iraq?’, Rudaw, 8 January 2016. Available at: http://rudaw.net/english/kurdistan/080120161.
36  ‘Lack of  Responsiveness Impacts Mood: August–September 2015 Survey Findings’, Greenberg Quinlan 
Rosner Research. Available at: https://www.ndi.org/files/August%202015%20Survey_NDI%20Website.pdf.
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Kurdish political factions with contrasting positions vis-à-vis the Iraqi government. 
This makes it difficult to argue for a single Kurdish position. However, there is also no 
denying that both political factions, the KDP and the PUK, are pro-independence – 
despite different visions of  what such independence should look like, and how or when it 
should happen. It is therefore reasonable to assume that a nationalist aspiration for state-
hood is an ideal shared by most Kurdish political leaders, and society in general. 
By showing its commitment to international standards of  governance, such as human and 
democratic rights, the KRG seeks to present the Kurdistan Region as a potential inde-
pendent state. The KRG seeks to enhance its positive image internationally compared to 
that of  the government in Baghdad from which it hopes to secede. When seeking inter-
national support for the resolution of  disputes against their counterparts, separatists may 
adopt a political agenda that includes the governance principles of  those from whom they 
seek support – as the KRG’s adoption of  democratic norms of  governance,37 especially if 
‘norm-takers believe that new outside norms could be used to enhance the legitimacy and 
authority of  their extant institutions and practices’.38 
Kurdish nationalism, as opposed to Iraqi or Arab nationalism, underlies these efforts. 
Separatist nationalists challenge the nation state within which they are located by 
differentiating themselves from the majority’s identity,39 building on their ethno- 
national differences and/or their different civic ideals, which may include a dif-
ferent form of  governance. Kurdish officials often state their willingness to bring 
their legal system and practices to the level of  international standards on wom-
en’s rights,40 especially on violence against women,41 and they have consistently 
argued that they are doing better than the Iraqi government in ensuring freedoms, 
democratic governance and minority and religious rights. This has enabled transnational 
women’s rights networks in the Kurdistan Region to put pressure on the government.42
The underlying context that enables the KRG to pursue such a policy is the Kurdistan 
Region’s links to the Western world. Diane King’s excellent social anthropological study 
explains the Kurdistan Region’s increasing connection to the outside world and how this 
has transformed its local–global relations.43
37  Yaniv Voller, ‘Contested Sovereignty as an Opportunity: Understanding Democratic Transitions 
in Unrecognized States’, Democratization 22/4 (2015), pp. 610–630. 
38  Acharya, ‘How Ideas Spread’, p. 248.
39  Anthony Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). 
40  ‘Head of  Foreign Relations: KRG supports women’s equal participation in all fields’, KRG Official 
Website, 2007. Available at: http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?s=010000&l=12&a=21693.
41  ‘Interview with Yousif  Mohammad Aziz, Minister of  Human Rights’, KRG Official Website. Available 
at: http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/print.aspx?l=12&smap=010000&a=27864.
42  Voller, ‘Countering Violence’. Kurdish movements in Syria and Turkey also use norms of  gender 
equality. This gives these movements some popularity in the international arena especially in the face 
of  rising religious fundamentalism in the Middle East. Patrick Cockburn, ‘War with ISIS: Meet with 
the Kurdish Women’s Militia’, The Independent, 25 May 2015. Available at:   http://www.independent.
co.uk/news/world/middle-east/war-with-isis-meet-the-kurdish-womens-militia-fighting-for-their-fam-
ilies-west-of-the-syrian-town-of-10274956.html. 
43  Diane King, Kurdistan on the Global Stage: Kinship, Land and Community in Iraq (New Brunswick, New 
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Throughout the 1991 and 2003 interventions in Iraq, the KRG has come to rely on exter-
nal political, economic and military support, with international/multilateral organisations 
and foreign states becoming integral to the Region’s political, economic and developmen-
tal affairs.44 Rebuilding state and society relations, democratic institutionalisation, and 
supporting the development of  civil society have been the goals of  Western actors in the 
region. This has created a context where the local population, government offices and 
ministries work closely with international actors, including UN agencies, foreign state 
departments and the UN Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI). The KRG has also been 
working in collaboration with UNAMI and other UN agencies in reforming the legal 
system and political institutions. The latter monitor the government’s progress, provide 
advice on further reforms and the implementation of  the new and existing laws, and put 
pressure on the government in these areas.45 
Multilateral organisations and states have redefined the way local NGOs work in the 
Kurdistan Region by directly funding and supporting the creation of  new NGOs that are 
financially independent from the government. Interestingly, many of  the local women’s 
NGOs view the UN as part of  the government. Some complain that the UN is channel-
ling funds for civil society through the government, which in turn only supports those 
organisations of  which it approves, thus neglecting those that are critical of  its policies.46 
These debates indicate that the UN is perceived almost like a domestic actor. Some 
NGO representatives believe the UN should put more pressure on the government in 
removing discriminatory laws, allocating more resources to awareness-raising and moni-
toring implementation. Those who are critical of  the government’s insufficient emphasis 
on women’s issues state that the UN should also work more directly with NGOs. On the 
other hand, UN representatives emphasise the UN’s mandate to advise the government 
when it needs such advice. 
Overall, representatives of  international organisations and UN agents confirmed that 
they found it easier to carry out work in the Kurdistan Region than the rest of  Iraq, due 
to the relative safety of  the Region and thanks to the KRG’s receptiveness. Although the 
Region is now under significant threat from Islamic militant groups and the war in Syria, 
it still remains a relatively peaceful part of  Iraq. Another discourse heavily criticises the 
Iraqi regime’s regressive policies and its treatment of  the Kurds. This view interlinks with 
Kurdish nationalist aspirations and leads to the belief  that remaining part of  Iraq is a hin-
drance to progress.47 This is in line with the Kurdish nationalist narrative and the rejection 
of  political Islam, that are embedded within most of  the discourses and goals of  Kurdish 
women activists.48 
Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 2013). 
44  Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State. 
45  Author interviews with UNAMI and UN Women officials, Erbil and via Skype (January–April 2014). 
46  Author interviews with local women’s NGO representatives, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah (April–May 2014).
47  Author interviews with the General Secretary of  High Council of  Women’s Affairs and KDP Mem-
bers of  Parliament, Erbil (April–May 2014).
48  Al-Ali and Pratt, ‘Between Nationalism and Women’s Rights’; Brown and Romano, ‘Women in Post-
Saddam Iraq’.  
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The level of  criticism of  international actors is relatively low in the Kurdistan Region 
compared to at the national level. Although a degree of  criticism of  the 2003 intervention 
and what followed can be observed, the majority of  those interviewed during fieldwork in 
the Kurdistan Region had a positive perception of  the intervention.49 Some of  them even 
rejected the concept of  ‘invasion’ and preferred the term ‘liberation’. Such sentiment is 
less evident in other parts of  Iraq.50 Many Iraqis would agree with the view that the 2003 
intervention created divisions in society, led to extremism and internal military conflict, 
destroyed state institutions, and created insecurity and violence,51 all of  which negatively 
affected women’s rights.52 The intervention and the structural, legal and political faults in 
the new Iraqi Constitution53 contributed to the chaos that ensued in Iraq, while the Kurd-
ish Region enjoyed relative stability and security accompanied by increased autonomy. 
For the KRG, the intervention led to some level of  independence from Baghdad, which 
came at the cost of  external dependence and remaining part of  Iraq.54 For the new Iraqi 
regime, it meant further loss of  control over the northern part of  the country. 
New laws and amendments in the Kurdistan Region have not had a significant positive 
impact on women’s lives, owing to a lack of  implementation and monitoring. Represen-
tatives of  NGOs that focus on women’s rights criticise the government for not pushing 
harder on both accounts and for not changing or eliminating remaining discriminatory 
laws and practices in the Penal Code and Personal Status Law.55 Government officials 
blame the Iraqi government’s lack of  incentive. They state that the amendment of  laws 
or the implementation of  new ones by the Kurdish parliament sometimes remain limited 
and ineffective because they are overruled by Iraqi national laws.56 
Kurdish officials also argue that the Region’s economic dependence on the government 
in Baghdad limits their ability to make progressive institutional and structural changes. 
49  According to Krajeski, some Kurds approve of  international intervention as a method of  spreading 
the ideals of  democracy, see: Jenna Krajeski, ‘The Iraq War Was a Good Idea, If  You Ask the Kurds’, The 
Atlantic, 20 March 2013. Available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/03/
the-iraq-war-was-a-good-idea-if-you-ask-the-kurds/274196/.
50  F. Gregory Gause III et al., ‘The Future of  the Middle East: Strategic Implications for the United 
States’, Middle East Policy 14/3 (2007), pp. 1–28.  
51  Toby Dodge, Iraq’s Future: The Aftermath of  Regime Change (London: Routledge, 2005); Zaid Al-Ali, The 
Struggle for Iraq’s Future: How Corruption, Incompetence and Sectarianism Have Undermined Democracy (Croydon: 
Yale University Press, 2014). 
52  Deniz Kandiyoti, ‘Between the Hammer and the Anvil: Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Islam and 
Women’s Rights’, Third World Quarterly 28/3 (2007), pp. 503–517; Al-Ali and Pratt, What Kind of  Liber-
ation?; Pratt, ‘Iraqi Women and UNSCR 1325’; Al-Ali, ‘Reconstructing Gender’; Ismael and Ismael, 
‘Living through War, Sanctions and Occupation’.  
53  Saad Jawad, ‘The Iraqi Constitution: Structural Flaws and Political Implications’, LSE Middle East 
Centre Paper Series 1 (London: London School of  Economics, 2013). Available at: http://www.lse.ac.uk/
middleEastCentre/publications/Paper-Series/Iraqi-Constitution.aspx.
54  Natali, The Kurdish Quasi-State.
55  Author interviews with local women’s rights NGOs, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah (April–May 2014). 
56  Author interview with the High Council of  Women’s Affairs representatives, Erbil (April 2014). The 
I-NAP also states that despite changes in the legal provisions at regional level, implementation of  these 
new laws and changes remain limited due to discriminatory national laws.
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Due to a lack of  funding, government institutions responsible for gender mainstreaming 
are not able to work effectively, to allocate staff  for policy implementation, to train staff 
on gender, to support and protect vulnerable women, or to undertake a wide range of 
awareness-raising activities or capacity-building training. In other words, they use the dis-
pute over budget between the two governments to highlight Baghdad as an impediment 
to their progress and to justify their demand for separation. 
However, it is necessary to put these views into context. When the Iraqi Constitution 
was approved in 2005, issues surrounding oil and disputed territories in the Kirkuk area 
were left unresolved. The Constitution stipulates that Baghdad must give 17 percent 
of  national oil revenues to the Kurdistan Region. The KRG argues that this provision 
excludes the newly discovered oil fields, over which it claims full control, and from which 
it has been exporting oil illegally according to the government in Baghdad. As for the ter-
ritorial dispute, the KRG claims an area that exceeds the official boundaries of  the three 
governorates under its control, particularly in the oil-rich Kirkuk region. In their failure 
to resolve these issues, both the governments in Erbil and Baghdad share responsibility. 
Although the issue of  budget transfer is a significant problem for the KRG, another 
reason why funds allocated to gender-focused projects and to the proper implementation 
of  the new rules are decreasing could be the widespread corruption and mismanagement 
of  regional income by the government.57 The political crisis is partly due to President 
Masoud Barzani’s refusal to leave office despite the end of  his term. Issues such as cro-
nyism, corruption, unemployment and irregular salary payments are causing significant 
levels of  discontent among the population, which has led to protests in many parts of  the 
Kurdistan Region.58 
There are also downsides to international involvement. The prescriptive nature of  inter-
national norms and the Western liberal peace discourse on institutional restructuring and 
civil society engineering negatively affect the will of  locals.59 Iraqi human rights activists 
raised issues with the UN’s implementation of  1325 in Iraq, particularly with regards to 
57  Kawa Hassan, ‘Kurdistan’s Politicized Society Confronts a Sultanistic System’, Carnegie Middle East 
Centre, August 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CMEC_54_Hassan_11.pdf.
58  Ibid.
59  Nicola Pratt and Sophie Richter-Devroe, ‘Critically Examining UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace 
and Security’, International Journal of  Feminist Politics 13/4 (2011), pp. 489–503; Alejandro Bendana, 
‘From Peacebuilding to State Building: One Step Forward and Two Steps Back?’, Development 48/3 
(2005), pp. 5–15. In different contexts, international practice elsewhere has been criticised; UN’s insti-
tutional hierarchy and sexism, international actors’ cultural assumptions about women’s status and 
lack of  awareness of  how gender inequality affects society and their reluctance to implement CEDAW 
and the WPS agenda in transitional processes conflict-affected and fragile states.  Helen O’Connell, 
‘What Are the Opportunities to Promote Gender Equity and Equality in Conflict-Affected and Fragile 
States? Insights from a Review of  Evidence’, Gender & Development 19/3  (2011), p. 458; Barbara Miller, 
Milad Pournik and Aisling Swaine, Women in Peace and Security through United Nations Security Resolution 1325 
(Washington DC: Institute for Global and International Studies, 2014). For criticisms of  US interven-
tions in Iraq and Afghanistan, see: Al-Ali and Pratt, What Kind of  Liberation?; Kandiyoti, ‘Between the 
Hammer and the Anvil’.
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women refugees, trafficking of  women and addressing poverty amongst women.60 These 
are valid criticisms and certainly constitute part of  the discourse among NGOs and polit-
ical activists in the Kurdistan Region.
Also significantly problematic are the all too familiar issues related to NGO funding. 
NGOisation, a phenomenon that refers to the allocation of  funds to civil society for the 
advancement of  liberal and global agendas, is not unique to the Kurdistan Region. For 
instance, USAID (the American government agency responsible for non-military foreign 
aid) handed out cash to some women NGOs to produce and distribute advertisements 
in favour of  the new Iraqi Constitution.61 Also, after the initial years of  the intervention, 
international funding to local NGOs in Iraq and Iraqi Kurdistan has decreased. Since 
late 2011, government funding has also ceased. These factors limit the ability of  NGOs to 
sustain their work. Third, high levels of  corruption amongst local women’s rights organ-
isations is subject to much discussion amongst the wider population in the Kurdistan 
Region. There are questions surrounding the amount of  funds are allocated to NGOs and 
how they are used. Finally, local NGO activities are highly politicised and geographically 
divided. Kurdish women’s rights NGOs tend to be linked to one of  the main political 
parties, especially in the Erbil and Sulaymaniyah governorates. 
Conclusion
The Kurdistan Region and Iraq as a whole share similar social, economic, institutional 
and normative characteristics. Despite this, the KRG has internalised the principles set 
out by CEDAW and the WPS agenda to a greater extent than the Iraqi government. The 
Kurdistan Region has higher female quotas at the parliamentary, governorate and legis-
lative council levels. It has also made a number of  amendments to law articles that are 
discriminatory towards women and introduced new legal regulations to increase compli-
ance with international women’s rights. 
The Kurdistan Region’s international links, combined with its aspiration to increase its 
credibility as a potential independent state are factors that led to the KRG following slightly 
different gender equality policies from the Iraqi government. Conditionality of  interna-
tional aid and the need for international support incentivised the KRG to undertake such 
policies. Nationalist efforts to depict Iraqi Kurds as more progressive and democratic 
than Iraqi Arabs has underlined this process. Long-term international involvement in the 
Kurdistan Region of  Iraq had three consequences: firstly, it increased Kurdish autonomy 
from the government in Baghdad; secondly, it integrated international actors into the 
domestic administrative, political, economic and social life of  the Kurdistan Region; and, 
thirdly, it promoted the perception that external connections would help the Kurdistan 
Region achieve its long-term goal of  independence. 
60  Pratt, ‘Iraqi Women and UNSCR 1325’, pp. 612–613.
61  Shahrzad Mojab, ‘Women’s NGOs Under Conditions of  Occupation and War’, Solidarity 129 (July–
August 2007). Available at: https://www.solidarity-us.org/node/576.
20 Gender and Statehood in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq
Examining the relationship between the Kurdistan Region’s international links and its 
policy decisions provides important insights into why gender equality varies between the 
regional and national levels in Iraq. Intersecting factors at local and international levels 
provide the facilitating context for the introduction of  a greater number of  gender equality 
laws in the Kurdistan Region. This is a significant achievement but much still needs to be 
done to change remaining discriminatory rules and practices in the region, and to properly 
implement and monitor laws in order to make a real impact on the lives of  women.
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